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Abstract 
This paper presents a critique of emergent views on the roles of the boards of directors in relation to information 
security. The analysis highlights several concerns about the separation and validation of proper theory and 
business assertions of information security at board level. New requirements articulated by industry bodies – 
represented by a selected group of experts and evident in literature – are compared to the underlying theory of 
corporate governance to identify possible discrepancies. The discussion shows in particular the importance of 
staying within the theoretical underpinnings of corporate governance when discussing the topic of governance in 
general and in relation to boards of directors’ responsibilities. Our critique opens up more opportunities to 
clarify information security’s role and relationship to corporate governance. We seek to draw particular 
attention to the appropriate separation of governance and management. This latter point we hope will encourage 
academics and business practitioners to reflect on current corporate and individual biases and on the way terms 
such as information security governance are represented.  
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Introduction 
The scandalous corporate collapses in the early part of this decade necessitated a renewed emphasis on corporate 
governance. Accordingly, attention has been paid to corporate governance across all sectors and industries and at 
all levels of organisations. Legislative (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CLERP9), government and industry regulatory 
(ASX 2003, SEC, NYSE, NASDAQ) and self-regulatory (AS 8000 series) requirements have all aimed to 
improve corporate governance practices. 
A great number of these requirements targeted the boards of directors. This is not surprising as boards have 
significant responsibilities and perform essential and important functions governing the organisation. It is 
interesting to note that a number of industry groups have started to call for the establishment of IT and of 
information security governance (IIA, 2000, BSA, 2003 and CGTF Report, 2004, CIMA 2004, CICA, 2004) as 
part of the boards’ activities and responsibilities. Some stated directly that information security was the 
responsibility of the board (ISACA 2001, Westby, 2004). Following these “call to action” documents, there have 
been attempts to redefine corporate governance (Hamaker 2003a and 2003b) by at least one organisation 
(ISACA). Although there seems to be a lack of theoretical foundation for such statements and definitions, the 
terminology (i.e. enterprise governance in place of corporate governance) has proliferated within the audit 
industry, causing confusion. 
The question then arises as to whether those calls are justified and whether these calls are targeting the right 
level, i.e. the board? Should IT and/or information security be governed by the board? If yes, why and how, if 
not, who should be responsible for information security and at what level? Is corporate governance really 
changing as described and advocated? What is the underlying theory of IT and/or information security 
“governance”? Is this a legitimate terminology? Is there a legitimate theory? How is information security related 
to corporate governance?  
Such questions prompted this study. Although these are all crucial issues with regards to the concept of 
information security’s role in corporate governance, this paper focuses only on certain aspects of concerns 
raised. The intention was to ascertain the validity of claims such as “information security should become an 
important and integral part of IT governance” (ITGI 1, 2001); that “IT governance is the responsibility of the 
board of directors” (ITGI 2, 2003) and that “the road to information security goes through corporate 
governance” (CGTF 2004). Other, related issues indicated above will be discussed elsewhere. 
Arguably, since boards of directors are often the subjects of such claims, the theoretical underpinnings for the 
boards’ activities need to be looked at. The fundamental aspects of the boards’ activities and how these activities 
fit into corporate governance need to be investigated. Drawing on the theoretical foundations of corporate 
governance, analyses could be made as to whether the aforementioned claims fit into the activities of the boards 
of directors. A discussion on corporate governance and its theoretical underpinnings is presented in the following 
section in order to highlight the theoretical lens through which the research was conducted. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The corporation is the paramount form of the business organisation. Similarly, corporate governance and the 
need for it is an integral part of the corporation itself. The most important pre-existing conditions for the 
corporation are democracy and private property (Bernstein, 2004). Protecting investors’ private property while 
attracting them to invest their capital in the corporation is the fundamental goal of corporate governance (Berle 
and Means, 1932). 
The essence of corporate governance can be derived from the belief that there are “certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” as expressed in the American Declaration of 
Independence (1776). Corporate governance is meant to protect the individual’s right of freedom in the market, 
by ensuring the moral behaviour of those acting in the marketplace (Smith, 1759). Interestingly, Smith later built 
his market theory and system of market capitalism on these principles (Smith, 1776).  
These principles can be further understood in the context of the religious orientation of both the signatories of 
the Declaration of Independence and Smith. Millstein calls this the Micah principle (Millstein, 2004). It is 
derived from Micah 6:6-8 and advocates in effect fulfilling the spirit of the law rather than adhering only to the 
letter of the law. The concept in Micah 6:8 of “to do justice, to love kindness” (NASB) is seen to correspond with 
Smith’s “prudence, justice and beneficence” and indicates an ethics that doesn’t aim to deliberately cause 
damage to others while pursuing self-interest. This ethical stance is similar to Benjamin Franklin’s deist ethics or 
what Weber calls the “protestant ethic” (Weber, 1930). Millstein argues therefore that “box-ticking” lacks 
substance and protecting shareholders’ interests should be ingrained in the culture of boards (Millstein, 2004, p. 
12) instead of being viewed as a set of rules that need to be conformed to. 
In summary, the three core concepts of corporate governance are: 
1. The inalienable rights of the individual; 
2. The protection of these rights of the individual in the market; 
3. The highly ethical behaviour of the actors in the market. 
These three principles, especially the expectations of ethical behaviour, are at the core of most theories 
developed during the last 100 years. It can be argued that such an ethic and expression of virtue expressed by 
Smith and his contemporaries has somewhat disappeared in the ensuing decades leaving a vacuum, which many 
of the theories in corporate governance seem to be attempting to address. The principle of ethical behaviour 
advocated by Smith is still relevant today and it is therefore suggested that each theory be considered through the 
lenses of the above three principles. The theory that appears to fulfil those principles best is then suggested to be 
taken as the platform on which the industry body claims are going to be evaluated. 
As the corporation and the marketplace itself became more complex, a number of – often competing – theories 
were developed to address such complexities:  
 
• Agency theory deals with the issue of protecting shareholders’ interests (Berle and Means, 1932). This 
is especially important when conflict between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
Jensen and Ruback, 1983) arises due to information asymmetry. This can be seen when self interest, 
coupled with insider knowledge, causes managers not to act in the interest of stakeholders.  
• Resource Dependence Theory emphasises the relationship between the corporation and its environment 
(Pfeffer, 1982, Hayward and Boeker, 1998). The board is viewed as a tool “to manage environmental 
uncertainty” (Boyd, 1990). This theory appears to consider corporate governance within the field of 
finance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This however seems to be a narrow view and it can be argued that 
many aspects of board activities can’t be explained through finance, economics or accounting. 
• Transaction Cost Economics argues that “transaction is the basic unit of economic analysis” 
(Williamson, 1981), and as such transaction needs to be matched with governance structure to enjoy 
better efficiencies (Williamson, 1979). The organisational behaviour approach this theory builds on 
provides interesting insights into board behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983), financing structures and 
ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The theory however doesn’t seem to cover all three underlying 
principles discussed above.  
• Stewardship Theory advocates that instead of the separation of board and managers, the combination of 
these two groups will service the shareholders’ interest best (Donaldson, 1990, Donaldson and Davis, 
1991, Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1977). Yet this theory seems to focus more on the relationship 
between the two groups rather than on the tasks these groups perform (Albanese et al, 1997). While this 
study is interested in the relationship between governance and management, this theory seems to 
provide too narrow a lens for the investigation. 
• Stakeholder Theory expands the theory of control beyond the shareholders and their agents (Davis et al, 
1977, Freeman, 1984, Mitchell et al, 1977, Byrson, 2004). Everybody who has a legitimate interest in 
the enterprise or is affected by it has the right to influence the corporation (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). This view however equals the interests of participants (whether interested in or affected by the 
corporation) and “rejects the idea that the enterprise exists to serve the interest of its owners” (Weiss, 
1995). While it is acknowledged that a corporation can not operate in a vacuum with only its owners’ 
best interests in mind, the necessary conditions that must be met can’t replace completely the owners’ 
interest. Such conditions include social and environmental responsibilities. Notwithstanding this macro 
environment, this theory seems to be more appropriate to public administration (Bryson et al, 2002) 
than to private enterprise.  
 
From the above précis, it can be concluded that these theories address the three underlying concepts (individual’s 
rights, market and ethical behaviour) to a certain degree. It could be argued however, that most of the 
aforementioned theories seem to miss at least one of the core concepts, thus providing an incomplete picture. Of 
the theories outlined above, it would appear that agency theory is the most successful in addressing all three 
concepts. In effect, the theory could be used to explain how corporations were governed. Furthermore, 
particularly in the context of corporate governance, there seems to be a renewed focus on agency theory 
(Colley et al, 2003) lately. The essence of the theory is also recognised in such cornerstone documents as the 
Cadbury (1992) or Dey (2004) Reports; in current legislations (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002) or in current 
textbooks (Monks, 2001, Chew & Gillan, 2005). In order to clarify the connection between the agency theory 
and corporate governance (as well as the aspects of information security as part of corporate governance), the 
following section will explore the issue of corporate governance from an agency theory perspective. 
AGENCY THEORY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND INFORMATION 
SECURITY 
Agency theory advocates the separation of ownership and control of the corporation (Berle and Means, 1932). 
The key participants according to this theory are the principals (shareholders) and their agents. The principals 
delegate work to the agents who perform the work on behalf of the principals. A conflict arises when the interest 
or goals of the principals differ from their agents or their attitude towards risk differs. These two issues are 
known as “the agency problem” and “risk sharing problem” both of which agency theory attempts to solve 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Although the study of corporate governance today goes beyond the framework of Berle and Means, with 
considerable revision and refining comments (Monsen et al., 1968, Larner, 1970, Fama and Jensen, 1983 and 
perhaps most importantly, Zeitlin, 1974), it has set the terms of the debate on corporate governance for almost a 
century. It is important to note here, that the idea was not of Berle and Means’ own devising, as Smith had drawn 
attention to the same issue in the late eighteenth century (Smith, 1776, p. 192).  
As the divergence of interest between ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1968, pp.112) was identified, 
this separation gave birth to the professional management class (Cochran and Wartick, 1988), which later 
evolved into two distinct directions: management and governance (Taylor, 2002, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2005).  
The distinction between management and governance has been defined along the lines of strategic direction 
setting and hands-on, operational activities (Mueller, 1979, Tricker, 1997).  
 
Governance is concerned with the intrinsic, purpose, integrity and identity of the institution, with 
a primary focus on the entity’s relevance, continuity, and fiduciary aspects. Governance involves 
monitoring and overseeing strategic direction, socio-economic and cultural context, externalities, 
and constituencies of the institution. (Mueller, 1981, p.9) 
 
The operational activities of management are not replicated at board level. As the agency theory that brought 
governance into focus indicates, there is a distance between the directors, the shareholders they represent and the 
managers they oversee. Governance ensures that the right managers are doing the right job in the right way, in 
the best long-term interest of the shareholders.  
 
The governance role is not concerned with running the business per se, but giving overall 
direction to the enterprise (Tricker, 1984, p.6.). 
 
The separation of governance and management is also important from the viewpoint of who is in charge 
(Firstenberg and Mankiel, 1994 and Lorsch and McIver, 1989). The issue of controlling the corporation and the 
structure of relationships at the top is very important, because of the power and impact of the corporation (Berle 
and Means, 1932). As Lorsch and McIver presented, directors do not view themselves as pawns of management 
(Lorsch and McIver, 1989), but rather as managers of managers. However this “management” is different from 
the senior and middle manager activities and it is appropriate to use governance to describe the activities of the 
board of directors. 
 
Management on the other hand, is more of a hands-on activity. In its traditional sense, 
management can be characterized as conducting or supervising action with the judicious use of 
means to accomplish certain ends. Management primarily focuses on specific goal attainment 
over a definite time frame and in a prescribed organization. Planning, staffing, administration 
and direction, measurement, control, innovation, representation, decision making, and operations 
are classical elements of management, which essentially strives to function as a closed, command 
and control system. (Mueller, 1981, p.9) 
 
Understanding the “management of management” concept of corporate governance is an essential element of 
contextualising terms like “IT governance” and “information security governance”. Information security 
literature also suggests that there is a governance side and a management side (Posthumus and von Solms, 2004, 
p. 644) for handling information security. The connection is made between corporate governance and 
information security by internal controls (von Solms, 2000, p. 217). The boards’ responsibility of due care is 
seen to apply to information as well (von Solms and von Solms, 2006b) and these responsibilities are discharged 
through the so called direct-control cycle (von Solms and von Solms, 2006a). Moulton and Coles note however 
that “security governance is still a mess. It is poorly understood and ill defined, and therefore means different 
things to different people” (Moulton and Coles, 2003, p. 580). 
The above quote highlights the core problem of “information security governance”. Although a significant 
amount of literature exists for information security at different levels, literature about governing information 
security is relatively thin, possibly as this field seems to be on the periphery of many different fields. This might 
be due partially to the view that information security is a technical issue (von Solms and von Solms, 2004), 
relating especially to computers.  
In order to avoid the confusion apparent in the “information security governance” field this paper focused on 
corporate governance, especially on board activities. The main purpose of the investigation was to identify the 
Board responsibilities in regard to information security. The study was built around agency theory and the 
instruments reflected such a position. Furthermore, this study took the position that such a separation of 
governance and management should be made and deliberately included questions aimed at verifying whether 
such position can be supported. The research design accommodated such verification and is discussed in the 
following section. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this study, a variant of the Delphi method (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963, Linstone & Turoff, 1975) was used for 
data collection. This method is applicable not only for forecasting (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 1997; Hayne & 
Pollard, 2000), but also for theory development (Bacon & Fitzgerald, 2001, Holsapple & Joshi, 2002; Mulligan, 
2002).  
The Delphi method was selected over other data collection methods because of its applicability to complex 
problems where reliable consensus of opinion is needed and incomplete knowledge exists about the phenomenon. 
Delphi is a proven method in these circumstances and has been practised by business and information 
technology researchers throughout the past four decades (Niederman et al., 1991, Peffers and Tuunanen, 2005, 
Keil et al, 2002, Brungs and Jamieson, 2005).  
The aim of this research, however, was not necessarily to reach a consensus as is the general aim of the Delphi 
method, but simply to gather experts’ opinions about the research area, thus enabling concept development. This 
approach is also a valid and recognised use of the Delphi method (Linstone and Turoff 1975, Bacon and 
Fitzgerald 2001, Holsapple and Joshi 2002, Okoli and Pawlowski 2004).  
 
The original plan was to employ two Delphi panels: one of industry experts comprising 15-30 people, and 
another one of 6-8 corporate governance practitioners. The first cycle is completed; the second cycle is in 
progress. While the composite Delphi cycle will add significant value to the investigation, the initial results are 
worth considering and are discussed in this paper. 
Industry experts were selected from a wide circle. Expertise was determined by publication, by conference 
activities, by position filled (past and present) and by general contribution to the particular field. As the research 
looked at overlapping areas of organisational and technology management, experts from each field were selected. 
The expert panel consisted of the following groups: 
 
• Auditors 
• Business leadership experts 
• Business strategy consultants 
• Corporate governance experts 
• CPAs 
• Information security experts 
• IT management experts 
• Partners of “the big 4” consultancy firms 
• Risk consultants 
 
By inviting two to three people from each group a panel was created where different views of governance were 
well represented. An important aspect of the panel size is the ability to balance and mitigate participants’ 
personal characteristics such as outspokenness or timidness. It is important not only to balance the bias that 
comes from the represented profession, but also to avoid dominance of one person or a small group even if the 
discussion happens online. Since the suggested size of a Delphi panel is 7-30 people (Allen, 1978, Dalkey, 2003), 
a panel of 25 people was both manageable and representative. 
As discussed above, the purpose of this study was not necessarily to reach a consensus, but to gather opinion. It 
can be argued that this is a legitimate method to accumulate data for the purpose of the Delphi method is “to 
handle opinions rather than objective facts” (Schmidt, 1997 cf Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). The opinions collected 
in the first Delphi cycle offer significant insights into the validity of the industry calls. The responses collected 
were compared and contrasted and an emergent picture was identified as described and discussed in the next 
section. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Due to geographical distances – participants lived or worked in North America, Europe, Asia and Australia – the 
questions were administered via email. Since the issue investigated is of “global/international” scale, experts 
needed to be selected at international level. Originally 30 people were contacted, but five people couldn’t fit 
participation into their schedule. The 25 participants were sent the first set of questions which consisted of a 
ranking exercise (ranking nine board level activities in order of importance) and four short questions.  
• Question 1 probed the participants’ understanding of corporate governance;  
• Question 2 explored that further in the context of information security inquiring about the participants’ 
views on information security and IT governance.  
• Question 3 explored views on where governance and management separated while  
• Question 4 queried the relationship between information security and corporate governance.  
Although each question generated interesting responses, this paper focuses only on Question 4. Question 1-3 
were needed to ascertain from the responses the context in which the analysis was going to be based on.  
All 25 participants responded. This was an overwhelming response and more than adequate within the limit of 
the recommended size of a Delphi group. The responses were collated, analysed and fed back for further 
comment based on the composite result. This procedure was repeated to adequately clarify points of views. 
The second round was conducted using an RASCI chart. Only eight of the original 25 responded, a sample close 
to the lower limit of the recommended Delphi group size, but still within the limit. However, the second round’s 
purpose was only to verify the emergent picture of the first round. This purpose was achieved even with the 
smaller number of respondents (Allen, 1978, Schmidt, 1997). 
The ranking exercise was connected to the fourth question, its purpose being to check the practical and 
theoretical view of participants. Either the ranking or the fourth question can be viewed and evaluated 
independently; together however they provide deeper insight into the phenomena.  
Similarly questions 1 and 3 were linked together. Again, the composite result to the two questions provides a 
deeper insight than the individual responses. 
Importance Ranking  
The ranking exercise of the first round asked participants to rank nine activities – undertaken by corporate 
governance practitioners – in order of importance (See Table 1 – Importance ranking). Information security was 
included as part of the nine activities. Participants were also allowed to make suggestions for extra activities they 
considered important to be included in the ranking. The ranking followed the Mann-Whitney method (Mann & 
Whitney, 1947) to provide an accurate composite view and was checked for validity by a statistics expert from 
Columbia University. The group’s consensus was that leadership and envisioning were the two most important 
aspects, while information security was ranked as being one of the lowest in importance.  
 
 
Table 1 - Importance ranking 
 
Responses to Questions 
Following the ranking, short questions probed the participant’s understanding about corporate governance’s 
relationship to information security. The first interesting result was that the majority of participants indicated that 
information security was considered essential for the board to fulfil their obligations. This was in sharp contrast 
to the ranking exercise. When explored further in the feedback, the emergent picture was that a difference exists 
between information security being essential to board practices and boards actually dealing with information 
security directly. This fits well within agency theory; therefore it can be argued that the role of information 
security in corporate governance and the board’s role in information security are two distinct roles. The former 
can be seen to focus on ensuring the level of reliability and quality of information required at board level. The 
latter can be considered as setting the legal/ethical boundaries; the culture of information security within the 
organisation. 
Another question probed the participants’ view on the difference between governance and management. The 
majority of responses identified a difference indicating that management was an operational activity, while 
governance was direction setting and controlling. This was similar to the views expressed in literature (von 
Solms, 2000, Posthumus and von Solms, 2004) and confirmed our starting position. 
Ambiguous Views on Governance 
The relationship between governance and management, however, was somewhat ambiguous. An emergent 
picture indicated that corporate governance had lower and higher levels. The former was practiced by executive 
management – the CxOs of the corporation – while the latter was practiced by the board. The lower level of 
governance included such activities as strategy, policy setting and so on. The higher level practice included 
ethics, disclosure, setting legal and regulatory boundaries and the like. This separation is not clearly present in 
literature, possibly because current literature doesn’t seem to make such a distinction. Investigating the concept 
further to clarity the issue should increase our understanding of corporate governance. 
A small number of respondents suggested that governance was a subset of management. While exercised by the 
board, governance actually replicated the activities of management at a higher level of abstraction. Although 
there are pointers to such a view in organisational theory, it is most likely a very narrow interpretation of early 
corporate governance literature (Berle and Means, 1932). The view was vigorously contested by the majority of 
participants on both practical and theoretical grounds. This particular view doesn’t fit into agency theory and 
thus should be rejected. Governance is distinct from management (Tricker, 1994, Mueller, 1979), and should not 
be considered as the same at a higher, abstract level. 
Gap in Views on Board Accountability 
The relevance of information security and its relationship to corporate governance was further explored in the 
subsequent feedback. A consensus emerged that “information security issues are of direct relevance to the 
corporation and its shareholders.” There was also an agreement that information security is “superior, rather 
than subordinate, to ‘technology’ issues”. The differences mostly relate to the degree of importance and the way 
it could fit into governance and what should be done at board level. 
Many industry experts – especially auditors, IT management experts and information security practitioners 
(group 1) – asserted that the board is responsible for information security practices. However, when asked for 
justification, the responses were vague. Information reliability as fundamental to the business required board 
attention was the most common answer, but this did not address the responsibility of the board. Further 
investigation is required to establish why group 1 characteristically held such a view without being able to 
explain why. The view however was challenged by corporate governance and business leadership experts (group 
2). They suggested that information security management was an operational issue, thus not the accountability of 
the board. The small number of responses received from directors of boards vehemently supported the opinion of 
the corporate governance experts. The different views were not reconciled as both sides maintained their views. 
The emergent picture is that a gap exists between information security and IT practitioners and corporate 
governance practitioners. It can also be contended that the former group has departed from agency theory. One 
might conclude that such departure lacks a theoretical underpinning and is difficult to justify.  
The implications of such departure are far reaching. It could be argued that most IT professionals do not have 
formal exposure to the underpinnings and practice of corporate governance. Further, an assertion could be made 
that there is very little awareness and understanding among most IT professionals regarding the functions, roles 
and activities of the board. This raises concerns regarding the consistencies and assumptions that underpin this 
view. Arguably, this lack of understanding has resulted in ill-defined governance (Hamaker 2003a and 2003b) 
and is the cause of confusion identified earlier in the IT audit profession. Further study about these phenomena is 
suggested about these phenomena in order to clear up misconceptions and misunderstanding, which are beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
Delphi, Round Two – The RASCI Chart 
The gap was further emphasised by the results of the second round. An RASCI chart was compiled listing 26 
activities (Table 3 – RASCI chart 1 and Table 4 – RASCI chart 2)related to information security. For each 
activity participants were asked to select who was accountable, who was responsible; who had a supportive role; 
and who needed to be consulted or informed. The role and responsibility definitions are shown below (Table 2 – 
RASCI definitions): 
 
 
Table 2 - RASCI definitions 
 
Group 1 participants in general assigned accountability and responsibility to the board for most activities.  
 
 
Table 3 – RASCI chart 1 
 
This assignment of accountability may be justified by saying that the board has the ultimate accountability for 
what the corporation does. Yet, this is considerably more difficult to justify in terms of responsibility. The board 
has neither the time, nor the resources, nor is and its focus so management-oriented. These aspects were reflected 
in the responses of Group 2 participants, which is shown below.  
 
 
Table 4 - RASCI chart 2 
 
The two views were impossible to reconcile. This is another strong indication that a significant gap exists in 
regards to boards of directors’ role and responsibility between IT and information security experts and corporate 
governance experts. As pointed out earlier, this gap is most likely due to a departure from agency theory and/or 
incorrect understanding (Hamaker, 2003a, 2003b) of corporate governance.  
The View Taken 
Since there are many inconsistencies and misconceptions in the views held by information security and IT 
experts, this paper considers the view of corporate governance experts as the more appropriate one. The gap 
however can be narrowed from both sides. Corporate governance experts need to consider changing boundaries 
and emerging issues such as privacy and reliability (which are major concepts in information security). 
Information security experts need to familiarise themselves with the theoretical and legal underpinnings of 
corporate governance. Since corporate governance’s boundaries and responsibilities defined by law, an approach 
that takes legal requirements and theoretical underpinnings into consideration is the best approach. 
As discussed earlier, the study has not been completed yet. The early indication is that information security and 
IT experts have a differing view on corporate governance from the corporate governance practitioners 
themselves. This differing view can cause a number of anomalies. It can be contended that each anomaly needs 
to be investigated and evaluated on its own merit. However, existing theories need to be considered and new 
views integrated with those existing theories. It can also be contended that in case of differing and irreconcilable 
views the one that has stronger theoretical underpinnings should prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
The validity of the claim that information security governance is the responsibility of the board needs further 
investigation. The aspects of due care, due diligence and vicarious liability need to be considered and compared 
to the three underlying concepts (individual’s rights, market and ethical behaviour) of corporate governance. It is 
most likely that information security has a role in corporate governance but that role has to be clearly identified 
and integrated within a corporate governance framework. 
The results of the described study highlight the importance of considering the underlying theory of corporate 
governance when discussing the topic of governance in general and in relation to boards of directors’ 
responsibilities. The emergent picture is that operational-type activities are expected from the boards of directors 
by certain industry groups; therefore the separation between senior management and the board is blurred. The 
term “governance” seems to be used differently for IT governance and information security governance by those 
industry bodies. The etymological roots are abandoned, and the usage is not always consistent with the usage in 
corporate governance literature.  
Since corporate governance is enshrined in law (Baxt, 1982, Berle and Means, 1932), care must be taken and 
changes can’t be suggested or made arbitrarily. It can be argued that anything advocated as the boards of 
directors’ responsibility must fit into the theoretical frameworks and underpinnings of corporate governance. 
Similarly, governance and management need to be clearly separated in order to understand the context of 
information security and IT governance. The provisional findings of this study suggest that information security 
governance or IT governance should be approached from a corporate governance framework rather than the 
other way around. 
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